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The removal of pluto from the class of planets
and homosexuality from the class of psychiatric
disorders: a comparison
Peter Zachar1 and Kenneth S Kendler2*
Abstract
We compare astronomers’ removal of Pluto from the listing of planets and psychiatrists’ removal of homosexuality
from the listing of mental disorders. Although the political maneuverings that emerged in both controversies are
less than scientifically ideal, we argue that competition for “scientific authority” among competing groups is a
normal part of scientific progress. In both cases, a complicated relationship between abstract constructs and
evidence made the classification problem thorny.
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Introduction
The controversies over psychiatric classification in the
past 30 years have garnered considerable attention. The
existence of rancorous debates about how to classify is
associated with claims that the developers of psychiatric
diagnostic systems inappropriately clothe themselves in
the aura of science without being scientific [1,2].
Although this article will not solve the problem of what
counts as a “legitimate” scientific approach, it will make
some claims about the role of debate between compet-
ing perspectives in the process of developing scientific
classifications.
The purpose of the article is to draw comparisons
between two different, yet surprisingly similar controver-
sies, namely, whether Pluto is a planet and whether
homosexuality is a psychiatric disorder. In our opinion a
compelling argument can be made that Pluto never
should have been classified as a planet to begin with
and that homosexuality never should have been labeled
a psychiatric disorder, and that the decisions to re-clas-
sify them were correct.
Let us discuss Pluto first. Pluto’s existence and loca-
tion was predicted by Percival Lowell based on discre-
pancies between the observed and predicted orbit for
Uranus. Astronomers, however, made a mistake when
predicting the orbit of Uranus. In their calculations they
plugged in an incorrect size for Neptune’s mass. If they
had plugged in the correct size, the difference between
the predicted and the observed orbits of Uranus would
not have been so great [3]. It was mere accident that in
1930 Clyde Tombaugh, the discoverer of Pluto, found
an object where Lowell said it should be.
With respect to homosexuality, in the late 19th cen-
tury there were active debates about whether same-sex
attraction was a vice, a medical condition, or a harmless
variation in behavior [4]. Its inclusion in psychiatric
taxonomies was initially related to the scientifically dis-
credited assumptions of degeneration theory - which
began life as a theological concept but was naturalized
following the introduction of evolutionary theories at
mid-century [5,6]. During the heyday of degeneration
theory, sexual practices such as masturbation and
homosexuality were considered to be signs of a progres-
sive psychic decline. Among the primary advocates of
this view was the psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing,
who was considered to be an authority on all manners
of “perversion.” In contrast, an opponent of the medica-
lization of homosexuality was Sigmund Freud - whose
subsequent theories on the nature of perversions
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replaced those of Krafft-Ebing for most psychiatrists [7].
Neither the rejection of degeneration theory nor Freud’s
opposition, however, prevented homosexuality from
being included in the first edition of the DSM.
An interesting similarity between the two cases was
that many people in both disciplines had become com-
mitted to the classifications for a variety of reasons
including respect for tradition and the role that the clas-
sification played in ongoing research programs - surely
something that occurs in most fields. In both cases the
constructs in question - planet and psychiatric disorder
- were abstractions that grouped heterogeneous entities
together. This allowed some debate about the proper
scope of the construct, and about the relationship that
pertains between new evidence and the classification.
A primary concern with this article is the issue of
scientific authority. Where should authority reside if a
scientific community cannot agree on how to resolve a
controversy? This is an ongoing problem in psychiatry,
as seen in disagreement between advocates for categori-
cal and dimensional models and disagreements about
what role biological substrates should play in psychiatric
classification. We argue that if it is practical for the
scientific community to allow disagreement and not
force a decision, then it should. If that is not practical,
then decisions are best made by a group of recognized
and well-informed experts who consult widely. One of
the most important aspects of such decisions, as illu-
strated by the Pluto and homosexuality controversies, is
that members of the wider scientific community must
perceive the process as fair. Fairness is an ethical con-
cept. In particular, we will explore how voting can serve
both ethical and epistemic ends in situations of
uncertainty.
The decision on Pluto: Not a planet
On August 24, 2006, members of the International
Astronomical Union (IAU) voted to remove Pluto from
the official list of planets. As noted earlier, Pluto was
classified as a planet because of mistaken assumptions
about its size at the time it was discovered. The event
precipitating this reclassification was the discovery in
2005 of Eris, located beyond Pluto. Being larger than
Pluto and having a moon, Eris appeared to be a 10th
planet.
Eris, however, has an orbit inclined 45 degrees relative
to the orbital plane of Earth. All the planetary orbits are
slightly inclined relative to Earth, but given its large
inclination, some astronomers proposed that Eris does
not belong in the class of things called planets because
its orbital path is so different from that of the other pla-
nets The problem was that Pluto also has an inclined
orbit, tilting 17 degrees relative to Earth’s plane.
No definitive argument for keeping Pluto but exclud-
ing Eris from the set of planets existed. Why not allow
Eris to be the 10th planet? If Eris and Pluto were both
classified as planets, several other bodies in the solar
system would also have to be included. For example, in
1801, a large body between Mars and Jupiter called
Ceres was discovered. It was briefly considered to be the
5th planet. At that time astronomers believed that the
gap between Mars and Jupiter was larger than it should
be given the size of the gaps between the other planets.
The location of Ceres made all the gaps systematic
again. Soon thereafter another body called Pallas was
discovered to also occupy the gap between Mars and
Jupiter. Next Juno and Vesta were found. Rather than
calling all of these bodies planets, they were classified as
asteroids.
The discovery of Eris suggested to some that the sta-
tus of Ceres should be revisited. Because Ceres can be
differentiated from the other asteroids by being large
enough to take a spherical shape, it was proposed that it
could also be classified as a planet. One other complica-
tion is that like Ceres, Eris is a part of a larger group of
objects. The group to which Eris belongs is called the
Kuiper Belt. Many additional Kuiper Belt objects (KBOs)
are larger than Pluto and have their own moons. A
looser definition of planet that accepts both Eris and
Ceres would also include many additional KBOs and
swell the number of planets to over 20.
Pluto was a problematic case even before the discov-
ery of Eris. In 2004 the IAU even created a Working
Group on the Definition of a Planet to deal with the
problem of Pluto’s status [8]. After considering many
proposals and counter-proposals, however, they could
not come to consensus. A variety of factors contributed
to this outcome. As Alan Boss [8] notes:
It is often said that the outcome of a committee’s
work is decided by who is chosen to sit on the com-
mittee. The same could be said of the IAU’s Work-
ing Group on the Definition of a Planet (p. 120).
After the discovery of Eris, the chair of the Working
Group forced a vote, in part because if the Working
Group could not decide, the IAU Executive Committee
might have resolved the problem on its own. It had to
be resolved before Eris could be officially classified.
Depending on the outcome, textbooks would have to be
rewritten and expensive research programs such as the
New Horizons mission would have to be redescribed.
When the vote was taken, seven were in favor of keep-
ing Pluto a planet, seven opposed, and seven favored a
compromise that would make “planet” a superordinate
category and then have several subcategories of planets.
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There was considerable drama at the 2006 Prague
conference where an official decision was to be made,
including last minute changes in the proposal by a
secretly formed Planet Definition Committee. The pro-
posal that was accepted by a majority of the members
present on the final day of the conference stated that a
planet orbits a sun (is not a moon), is massive enough
to take a spherical shape, and is not a member of a lar-
ger group of objects sharing the same orbital location (i.
e., it has “cleared” the neighborhood around its orbit).
Pluto, Eris and Ceres - which did not meet this defini-
tion - were put into a new category: dwarf planets.
The decision on homosexuality: Not a psychiatric disorder
The construct of homosexuality has immense sociocul-
tural significance. It has long been considered a perver-
sion that is both immoral and illegal (see Leviticus 18:22
for male homosexuality). In modern astronomy, the
scientific classification of the nine planets became a tra-
dition to which people were committed. In psychiatry,
commitment to a tradition preceded the classification,
primarily because cultural, religious and legal prohibi-
tions against homosexuality predated the birth of mod-
ern psychiatry.
On December 15, 1973 the Board of Trustees of the
American Psychiatric Association (APA) voted to
remove homosexuality from the official list of mental
disorders. What precipitated this reclassification was not
a single discovery; rather, it was a series of protests at
the annual conventions of the American Psychiatric
Association beginning in 1970. The protests initiated a
scientific and professional debate by those who sup-
ported homosexuality’s removal and those who wanted
it to remain a disorder. Between 1970 and 1973, the
debate was waged in the pages of psychiatry journals, in
committee meetings, and psychiatric conferences.
Bayer’s [9] listing of the relevant scientific information
follows:
The human sexuality studies of Alfred Kinsey and
his colleagues that showed surprisingly high preva-
lence rates (37%) for homosexual activity among
males, suggesting that it may represent a normal
variation in sexual behavior [10,11].
Anthropologist Clellan Ford and psychologist Frank
Beach’s [12] demonstration that prohibitions against
homosexual behavior are not universal nor is the
behavior limited to human beings.
Psychologist Evelyn Hooker’s [13] findings that
homosexual men are indistinguishable from a
matched sample of heterosexual men with respect to
psychopathology and that many homosexual parings
can be classified as long-term and committed
relationships rather than short term and compul-
sively driven relationships.
Two additional considerations also influenced psychia-
trists to change their minds about homosexuality’s clas-
sification. First, the protestors highlighted cases of social
discrimination based on sexual orientation that were
“justified” by claims that homosexuality was a mental
disorder. This shocked some psychiatrists, who viewed
their profession as playing a progressive role in defining
homosexuality as a disorder rather than a moral failing
subject to prosecution and imprisonment.
A second consideration was information gained from
personal encounters with homosexuals, especially gay
psychiatrists. Such encounters began to occur publically
at the 1971 APA meeting. Research in social psychology
has consistently demonstrated that positive personal
encounters reduce negative attitudes about outgroups
[14].
In one instance Robert Spitzer, who proposed the
solution that was accepted by the Board of Trustees,
attended a secret meeting of gay psychiatrists where he
was able to hear their personal testimonies [9]. Spitzer
[15] notes he came to see these individuals as underdogs
and as being in pain, and decided that he wanted to
help them. The DSM-II, which classified homosexuality
as a sexual deviation, was prepared by the APA’s Com-
mittee on Nomenclature and Statistics. The focus of the
protestors thereby shifted to the Nomenclature Commit-
tee by late 1972 [9,16-18]. Those who supported classi-
fying homosexuality as a disorder were concerned that,
due to its composition, the Nomenclature Committee
would support the deletion of homosexuality from the
DSM-II [9]. In response they formed their own Ad Hoc
Committee against the Deletion of Homosexuality and
wanted the Nomenclature Committee’s decision to be
reviewed by a specially appointed committee more
balanced in its composition. The astronomer Alan
Boss’s views about the effect that a committee’s compo-
sition can have on the outcome were shared by psychia-
trists some thirty years earlier.
As these debates continued, Spitzer came to the con-
clusion that homosexuality was different from other psy-
chiatric disorders. He observed that in many cases it was
accompanied by neither distress nor a general impair-
ment in social functioning [19,20]. Many psychiatrists at
the time held that heterosexual behavior represents opti-
mal functioning and homosexual behavior suboptimal
functioning. Spitzer [20] argued that if homosexuality
was labeled a disorder because it is suboptimal, then
other sub-optimal states should also be classified as
mental disorders, including religious fanaticism, racism,
and male chauvinism.
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Unlike his opponents, Spitzer did not believe that his
proposal would make it through the Nomenclature
Committee, so he bypassed them [18,21]. He turned his
focus to getting supportive votes from three additional
committees, which paved the way for the official 1973
decision by the Board of Trustees.
Opposition after the decision
One vocal opponent of the decision on Pluto was the
geophysicist Alan Stern. After the vote, he said: “I am
just disgusted by the way the IAU, which is meant to
represent the best in science, handled this matter”[22]
(p. 965). In collaboration with Mark Sykes, Stern circu-
lated a petition stating that they do not agree with the
new definition of a planet and would not use it. With
over 300 signatories, a press release following the pre-
sentation of the petition stated:
Planning is underway to establish an open and inclu-
sive grass-roots process by which planetary scientists
and astronomers from around the world can approach a
better resolution to the issue of planets in our solar sys-
tem and elsewhere, with every step and discussion in
public view. This process should culminate in a confer-
ence, not to determine a winner, but to acknowledge a
consensus [23].
Sykes [24] has compared the vote to a papal decree,
referring to the IAU classification as an ex cathedra list-
ing of planets, which he calls a misrepresentation of
science as the promulgation of “truth” by an “authorita-
tive” body.
The procedural complaint that surfaced immediately
following the decision was not that the definition was
decided by a vote. If that had been the issue, the com-
plaints would have preceded the vote. Prior to the con-
ference when the proposition was that planets are
massive enough to be spherical (which includes Pluto),
Pluto’s advocates saw a vote as representing informed
scientific consensus. After the roundness definition was
rejected, the complaint was that less than 30% of the
IAU’s 9000 members were at the conference and by the
time the vote was taken on the conference’s fourth day,
only a few hundred attendees remained [25].
The controversy continued at a 2008 Conference titled
The Great Planet Debate: Science as Process. The oppo-
nents of the new classification hoped that a different
consensus would be forthcoming, but the outcome of
the conference was quite similar to the outcome of the
original Working Group. Although a trend was noted
toward agreeing that the astronomical classifications of
the future will have to account for more diversity then
the current model’s categories of planet, dwarf planet,
asteroid, and comet, there was too much disagreement
for any consensus to emerge.
One of the interesting differences between the cases in
astronomy and psychiatry is that the official process for
deciding an issue in psychiatry does not include a vote
of the membership. Most of the authority is ceded to
committees of experts.
According to Bayer [9] and Socarides [17,18], many
psychiatrists vilified the decision on homosexuality as
scientifically unsound, harmful to legitimate patients,
immoral, politically motivated and a concession to the
mob. Comparisons with dogmatic pronouncements of
church councils were made as well. The difference
between this case and that of Pluto was a sentiment
among some conservative psychiatrists that not just the
profession, but also morality and civilization itself, had
been betrayed.
In essence, this movement within the American Psy-
chiatric Association has accomplished what every
other society, with rare exceptions, would have
trembled to tamper with, a revision of a basic code
and concept of life and biology [18] (p. 321)
After the vote of the Board of Trustees in 1973, the
Ad Hoc Committee against the Deletion of Homosexu-
ality did not go quietly away. Two of the chief oppo-
nents of the disclassification both prior to and after the
vote were Socarides [17,26,27] and Bieber [28,29] who
after the vote, circulated a petition, with 234 signatories,
demanding a referendum of the membership on the sta-
tus of homosexuality.
Like the astronomers in opposition to the Pluto deci-
sion, the protestors believed that the majority of the
members would take their side. They used a policy that
allowed a vote of the membership on procedural issues
to force the Board to agree to a vote on the classifica-
tion issue. Their argument was that the vote of the
membership would reflect the scientific consensus,
whereas the Board of Trustees’ decision reflected politi-
cal considerations.
The politics surrounding the vote were intense. The
Ad Hoc Committee defended its claim that homosexual-
ity was pathological with various psychoanalytic expla-
nations. Those supporting the Board’s decision argued
that the substantial scientific issues had been decided by
informed committees who studied the issues, and that
the practice of choosing a scientific classification by a
vote of members was inappropriate.
The vote of the membership was conducted by mail.
The complaint in astronomy about the vote on the defi-
nition of planet was that it was limited to a small num-
ber of conference attendees. Many psychiatrists were
concerned about a vote of the membership itself. In this
vote, the decision of the Board was upheld by 58% of
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the voting members. Afterwards, the psychiatric oppo-
nents claimed that the vote did not reflect a scientific
consensus because only 25% of the eligible voters turned
in their ballots [18].
Solving classification problems by proposing definitions
In both astronomy and psychiatry, the debates reached
near crisis proportions. In both cases the solutions were
proposed and voted on within a span of 12 months. In
both cases controversy was fueled by considerable inter-
est on the part of the media and the general public. For
example, the relevant New York Times headline in each
case read:
Psychiatrists in a Shift Declare Homosexuality No
Mental Illness
Vote Makes It Official: Pluto Isn’t What It Used To
Be
The crisis nature of the Pluto and homosexuality deci-
sions is signified by the pressure felt by the parties to
reach a decision. In each case, the crisis was brought to
closure by a proposed definition and agreement about
how the definition was to be applied. This is more evi-
dent in the case of Pluto, where developing a definition
was the explicit problem. In the case of homosexuality,
Spitzer’s compromise was also a definition, namely that
a psychiatric disorder involves distress, social occupa-
tional dysfunction, or both. Once psychiatrists accepted
the scientific data indicating that many cases of homo-
sexuality involve neither subjective distress nor dysfunc-
tion, and accepted Spitzer’s definition of disorder, they
were able to agree on disclassification in spite of having
different opinions about the desirability of variation in
sexual orientation.
Couldn’t astronomers have decided to not explicitly
define a planet? Yes, they could have. If we list the phy-
sical properties of an object such as Pluto in terms of its
composition, orbit, distance from the sun, evolution,
etc., no one would add “planet” to that list. The con-
struct of “planet” is physically irrelevant to the scientific
study of Pluto. It does not matter to Pluto or Ceres
whether they are classified as planets or dwarf planets.
The same cannot be said when we turn to classifying
homosexuality as disordered or normal. Although any
biological basis of a predisposition for homosexuality
will not be altered by its being classified as a psychiatric
disorder, the same cannot be said of its psychological
manifestation. What homosexuality is like psychologi-
cally in an environment where it is considered a disor-
der will meaningfully differ from what it is like in an
environment where it is considered a normal variation
in sexual orientation.
An important difference between planetary astronomy
and psychiatry is that, objectively speaking, there are
typically fewer consequences if astronomers decide to
leave a classificatory dilemma unsettled. Psychiatrists
and psychologists do not always have that luxury. People
present for treatment. Public health officials need infor-
mation about risk factors and prevalence rates for speci-
fic conditions. Insurance companies require codes to
process claims. Such consequences make it more diffi-
cult for psychiatrists to be what Mike Brown [30], the
discoverer of Eris calls, “naive.” By naive he means one
can simply think about scientific considerations and not
worry about the impact classifications have on culture.
Scientific Authority
In both astronomy and psychiatry, advocates on both
sides of the debate made claims that mirror the prototy-
pical junk science rhetoric, namely, that the final deci-
sion (or opposition proposal) was not supported by
rigorous scientific evidence, that the other side’s accep-
tance reflected political rather than empirical considera-
tions, and that the legitimate authority of “science” had
been usurped. In both cases a large middle group
avoided the political drama by not participating.
Astronomers disagreed about whether a planet can be
defined in terms of inherent properties (roundness) or
whether the role played by a body in a larger system is
relevant (clearing one’s orbit). Psychiatrists held different
background assumptions about the validity of clinical
experience versus empirical research. In each case, the
groups in opposition were composed of people from dif-
ferent research traditions. In astronomy it was the geo-
physicists versus the dynamicists while in psychiatry it
was practicing psychoanalysts versus research oriented
academics.
How, though, are investigators to decide issues when
the empirical evidence is deemed inadequate, and the
slow process of filtering out the pretenders impractical?
According to Beauchamp [31], when the evidence is
inadequate, mature communities make decisions follow-
ing procedures that are formulated to be fair. The role
of procedure suggests that scientific authority does not
lie with individual scientists, but with scientific commu-
nities - specifically in the publicly available writings pro-
duced by the communities over time. The scientific
literature can be seen as a history of various research
communities making competing claims [32,33]. Those
claims that have survived the competitive process earn
scientific authority. For example, in the debates between
different research communities about the role of natural
selection in evolution, the alternatives (the inheritance
of acquired characteristics, mutationism, and orthogen-
esis) have been shown to not be viable, whereas natural
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selection is viable. The Darwinians’ claims for the role of
natural selection are therefore considered authoritative
by the scientific community.
The role of the communities
Both Hull [32] and Longino [34] argue that the social
nature of science, in which people inside and outside of
a research community assess each other’s work, is
necessary for the objectivity on which scientific author-
ity rests. Hull emphasizes the competitive nature of
such assessment, a trend evident in both the Pluto and
homosexuality controversies.
Although we claim that scientific authority belongs to
communities, we do not seek to reify scientific authority
and treat it as a concrete entity. Scientific authority is
an idealized abstraction - analogous to abstractions like
human rights and justice. No individual or committee
can conform to this ideal for an extended period of
time. As evident from the controversies herein
described, those whose views do not prevail may experi-
ence disappointment - and may charge that the authori-
ties who made the final decision betrayed scientific
ideals.
An example of this disappointment is the complaints
about deciding scientific matters by voting. A vote is a
formal expression of opinion in response to a proposed
decision. Obviously it is problematic for decisions on
scientific matters to be subject to a timeline that is
external to the accrual of adequate information, but is
taking a vote inherently problematic? This view deserves
scrutiny, primarily because procedures analogous to vot-
ing are accepted elsewhere in science, for example in
grant and manuscript reviews. In situations of uncer-
tantly where the evidence does not compel acceptance,
voting has a role to play.
It is important to emphasize that rather than voting
itself, what actually upset the critics in the Pluto and
homosexuality controversies was that their belief that
the wrong communities had been ceded authority. In
astronomy, the geophysicists lost out to the dynamicists.
In psychiatry, the old guard psychoanalysts lost out to
younger, empirically-minded researchers.
Laudan [33] argues that conflicts between research
traditions are a normal part of science. Various commu-
nities have different research problems and different
stores of accessible information. When officially sanc-
tioned classifications are being decided, however, the
stakes become higher and the conflict intensifies. The
allocation of authority to a single classification preempts
the normal partitioning of epistemic authority across
diverse sub-communities. Such forced decisions typically
require compromises. But the expectation that the Pla-
tonic ideal called scientific authority can ever become
fully incarnate probably fictional.
The role of experts
If community decisions are to rise above being a popu-
larity contest they should be made by a group of
informed experts. But who picks the experts? All com-
munities have boundaries, defined by complicated trans-
actions between in-group and out-group members.
Decisions about who to include are always debatable.
In the controversies herein described, committees
were selected by professional organizations who wielded
political authority. There are also social structures in
place that help to establish expertise. In theory, expertise
represents a meritocracy where experts are identified
with respect to their past achievements. In Hull’s model,
reputations are earned by proving oneself in the compe-
titive process. “Reputation,” while ideally about compe-
tence, also has a social element. For example,
professional conferences function as occasions for net-
working and forming relationships. The relationships
formed can contribute to the development of expertise.
In both astronomy and psychiatry, it was agreed that
committee members should have knowledge and experi-
ence with respect to the classification issues under con-
sideration, but the kind of knowledge they should
possess was subject to debate. For example, in psychia-
try one of the complaints about the Nomenclature
Committee was that its members did not specialize in
studying homosexuality. Many of the specialists, how-
ever, were invested in the construct’s continued use and
therefore biased with respect to the outcome (they did
not want their specialty area eliminated). A broadly
representative group may not be able to make a deci-
sion; a narrowly constructed group may be too partial.
Problems are inevitable when decisions about scienti-
fic classifications are subject to socially-enforced time-
lines. In agreement with the philosopher Miriam
Solomon’s [35] arguments, we hold that it would be bet-
ter if empirical considerations were the leading factors
in any “vote,” but this is probably impossible. Even if a
dispute could be reduced to “scientific issues” between
research traditions, those in competing traditions have
diverse interests and investments that are sure to influ-
ence their decisions. For these reasons, it would be
naïve to believe that the answer to our classificatory
dilemmas is always to go out and find more data. The
problem is more typically one of deciding to which data
(and experts) to give priority.
Conclusion
Some readers of this history may conclude that the pre-
sence of partisanship and politics in astronomy does not
justify partisanship and politics in psychiatric nosology;
rather, in both cases it points to the fact that science is
done by fallible human beings. However, conflict and
Zachar and Kendler Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2012, 7:4
http://www.peh-med.com/content/7/1/4
Page 6 of 7
controversy are also part of the rational process of
scientific development.
Even if psychiatry is to be considered an immature
science, one shouldn’t conclude that the complicated
dynamics of developing psychiatric classifications are
solely contingent on either its immaturity or the unusual
partisanship of its members. Any scientific discipline, no
matter how well-developed, can be subject to such com-
plications as long as (a) it relies on abstract constructs
that classify a heterogeneous group as a single kind, (b)
the classification problems have psychological, social or
economic significance, and (c) the current classification
does not satisfactorily account for all the data.
When such thorny classification problems occur, and
their resolution cannot be delayed, disciplines need to a
have a fair and systematic way of choosing “experts” to
whom authority is given. Such groups need to be self-
critical, consider multiple and conflicting perspectives,
and not seek to merely defend their own strongly held
positions. The integrity of this process - the choice of
the experts and the approach of the experts to making
decisions - does not assure agreement, but it is essential
to the continued authority of scientific community itself.
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